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THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE AND
FLORIDA EVIDENCE LAW COMPARED
I. INTRODUCTION
The newly effective Federal Rules of Evidence must rank among
the most thoroughly analyzed legal developments of our genera-
tion.' In 1961 Chief Justice Warren appointed the Special Com-
mittee on Evidence to determine the advisability and feasibility of
developing uniform federal evidence rules. Pursuant to the committee's
findings, an advisory committee of distinguished practitioners and
scholars2 was formed in 1965. Over a period of years that committee
produced two drafts and a final set of proposed rules. The Supreme
Court accepted the Proposed Rules in 1972,3 but Congress withheld
immediate approval,4 and in late 1974 passed a substantially modified
version of the Rules.5
During the years of debate and revision it was anticipated that
the Federal Rules would command such respect as to inspire state
1. The Rules and background materials are compiled in AM. JUR. 2d New Topic
Service: Federal Rules of Evidence (1975); 28 U.S.C.A. (1975); 28 U.S.C.S. App. (1975);
20 U.S. Sup. Ct. Digest (1975). These volumes include texts of the Rules and Proposed
Rules, Advisory Committee notes to the Proposed Rules, congressional committee re-
ports and hearings, and long lists of annotations, articles, and commentaries on each
rule. Of particular importance are H.R. Rr.E. No. 650, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973)
[hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]; S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [herein-
after cited as SENATE REPORT]; and H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [herein-
after cited as CONFERENCE REPORT]. Each of these sources may be found in the above-
mentioned compilations. For discussion of the pedigree of the Rules, see HOUSE REPORT
2-3; Goldberg, The Supreme Court, Congress, and Rules of Evidence, 5 SETON HALL L.
REV. 667 (1974); Powell & Burns, A Discussion of the New Federal Rules of Evidence,
8 GONZAGA L. REV. 1 (1972); Spangenberg, The Federal Rules of Evidence-An Attempt
at Uniformity in Federal Courts, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1061 (1969); Note, Congressional
Preemption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 49 WASH. L. REv. 1184 (1974).
2. The composition of this committee, along with brief biographical sketches of
its members, is given in Spangenberg, supra note 1, at 1068-69.
3. 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972). Previous drafts of the Proposed Rules are reported at
46 F.R.D. 161 (1969) and 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971).
4. Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9, provided that the rules
as promulgated by the Supreme Court "shall have no force or effect except to the
extent and with such amendments, as they may be expressly approved by Act of
Congress."
5. Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595 (Jan. 2, 1975). With the exception
'of Rule 410, the Rules became effective on July 1, 1975. Rule 410 became effective
August 1.
The House made substantial changes in 36 of the 77 rules approved by the Court.
The House made minor changes (including changes in terminology) in 14 rules. The
Senate made 37 substantial changes in the House version. Those differences were re-
solved by a conference committee. 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7108 (1974).
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lawmakers to follow them.6 The Federal Rules embrace almost the
entire field of evidence law. Present Florida law, by contrast, is
physically and jurisprudentially fragmented. There are lacunae in
which no litigation has ever taken place.7 The resulting lack of simplici-
ty, integration, and easy accessibility is a flaw well appreciated by mem-
bers of the trial bar and bench who must recall these rules in-
stantaneously, often at peril of losing a case or committing reversible
error. Moreover, the current Florida approach fosters diverse rulings
at the trial level and thereby hampers predictability.
This note is concerned primarily with the substantive differences
between current federal and Florida evidence law. This comparison,
while hardly exhaustive, emphasizes discrepancies that recur frequent-
ly or that can affect outcome. The most noticeable discrepancy be-
tween current federal and Florida law is codification. Proposals for
codification of Florida evidence law have stalled twice in the legisla-
ture." With a few exceptions, the 1975 proposed Florida code resembles
the Federal Rules, adopting some of them verbatim. In the hope that
Florida lawmakers will resolve their differences over the proposed
6. See sources cited in Weinberg, Choice of Law and the Proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence: New Perspectives, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 594, 607 n.73 (1974).
7. See notes 70, 101, 115 and accompanying text infra.
8. The Florida Law Revision Council drafted a proposed code of evidence, with
extensive sponsor's notes, that was submitted to the legislature in the 1974 session.
See Fla. H.R. 3670 (1974); Fla. S. 1039 (1974). These bills were filed too late, however,
to receive extensive consideration. Their history and highlights are recounted in
Ehrhardt, A Look at Florida's Proposed Code of Evidence, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 681 (1974).
After circulation among the profession and modification by the Council, the proposals
were reintroduced in the 1975 session as Fla. H.R. 471 (1975). The code is modeled
after the Federal Rules of Evidence, although it retains much current statutory and
case law and draws some provisions from codes of other states. STAFF OF FLA. H.R. COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 1975 SESS., STAFF SUMMARY ON CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR FLORIDA 2 (Comm.
Print 1975). Although this measure, slightly amended, reached the calendar in the
House of Representatives and passed the Senate Judiciary-Civil Committee, it stalled
in the Senate Judiciary-Criminal Committee. Appearing before that committee on
May 23, 1975, Assistant Attorney General Raymond Marky suggested that the Florida
Supreme Court has the power to adopt the code under FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 2(a) (rules
for practice and procedure) and that some legislatively adopted evidence rules could
be unconstitutional. Interview with Raymond Marky, Assistant Attorney General of
Florida, in Tallahassee, Florida, May 30, 1975. Charles V. Ehrhardt, Reporter to the
Law Revision Council for the proposed evidence code, feels there are no constitutional
obstacles to legislative enactment of the code. He also suggests that the Florida Supreme
Court could adopt the code as rules of court. Ehrhardt believes it to be of overriding
importance, however, that one body, legislative or judicial, consider the entire set of
rules. Interview with Charles W. Ehrhardt, Reporter to the Florida Law Revision
Council, in Tallahassee, Florida, June 19, 1975. The bill will automatically return
to the calendar in the House and the Judiciary-Criminal Committee in the Senate at
the beginning of the 1976 session.
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code in the next session, this note indicates in passing those elements
of Florida law that would be affected by the 1975 proposed code.
The materials on presumption, privilege, and competency are pre-
sented together because the Federal Rules treat these issues identically;
that is, the Rules adopt state law in civil actions where state law
supplies the rule with respect to an element of a claim or defense. 9
These are particularly sensitive areas for forum shopping, since the
burden of proof and admissibility of whole blocks of evidence are at
issue. The hybrid approach adopted in the Federal Rules reduces, but
does not eliminate, forum shopping and choice of law problems.'
Federal and Florida law differ broadly in the areas of judicial
initiative, impeachment, and hearsay, which are considered next. Lesser
conflicts are found in remaining fields, which are considered as a pot-
pourri. The area of weight and sufficiency of evidence, although not
covered in the Federal Rules, is presented as an interesting adjunct.
Finally, some thought is given to possible underlying jurisprudential
differences between the two bodies of law.
II. PRESUMPTIONS, PRIVILEGES, AND COMPETENCY
There was extensive debate on how presumptions, privileges and
competency should be treated in the Federal Rules. Privileges in
particular were hotly contested; advocates of a uniform federal ap-
proach opposed those who favored conformity with state law." At
issue were both the wisdom of recognizing specific privileges and the
federal power thereby to thwart established state policies in diversity
cases. 12 Congress rejected proposed rules that would have recognized
9. See FED. R. EvID. 302 (presumptions), 501 (privileges), 601 (competency). Com-
pare the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws: the local law of the
forum determines what witnesses are competent and the admissibility of evidence
generally. Privileges, however, are handled by balancing the local law of the forum
against that of the forum having the most significant relationship with the communica-
tion; where conflict exists, the evidence is admitted in the absence of an overriding
policy consideration of one of the forums. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 137-39 (1971).
10. See notes 15-20 and accompanying text infra.
11. "Without doubt, the privilege section of the rules of evidence generated more
comment or controversy than any other section." Remarks of Representative Hungate,
4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7110 (1974). The varying positions on privilege are
argued in, e.g., SENATE REPORT 11-13; Dunham, Testimonial Privileges in State and
Federal Courts: A Suggested Approach, 9 WILLAMETE L.J. 26 (1973); Ladd, Symposium,
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: Privileges, 1969 LAW & SOCIAL ORDER 509, 555
(frequently indexed with the Arizona State Law Journal); Weinstein, The Uniformity-
Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of Federal Rules of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. REV.
353 (1969).
12. Privileges represent a manifestation of state policy that some consider sub-
stantive under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which held
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enumerated privileges in all federal actions; it enacted present Rule
501, which allows federal statutes, rules, and common law to govern,
except in civil actions in which state law supplies the rule with respect
to an element of a claim or defense. 13 As previously noted,'1 4 state law
is to be applied similarly in the areas of presumptions and competency.
The result in all three areas is unsatisfactory, for it remains un-
clear when state law should be applied15 The distinction is not based
on jurisdiction, for even in a federal question case state law may
supply the rule of decision, as where a federal statute incorporates
state law by reference," or where conflict of laws principles require
application of another forum's law. 17 The Rules are likewise unhelpful
where pendant jurisdiction is invoked, or where defenses, counter-
claims, cross-claims and third party claims with differing jurisdictional
bases are joined. Severance is not always a just solution."3 Finally, con-
as a matter of constitutional law that federal courts must apply state substantive
law in diversity of citizenship cases. One argument for the position that privileges are
substantive is that private individuals rely on state privilege law in making pre-litiga-
tion decisions. Compare PROP. FED. R. EvID. 501, Advisory Committee Note, 56 F.R.D.
230-34 (1972), with HousE REPORT 8-9 and SENATE REPORT 11-13. Compare Dunham,
supra note 11, and Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy, and Prerogatives: A Critical Examination
of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence as They Affect Marital Privilege, 61 CAL. L.
REV. 1353 (1973), with Ladd, supra note 1, and Note, Federal Rules of Privilege in Di-
versity Cases: A Time for Congressional Action, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1217 (1974).
13. This discussion of privileges is offered as an illustration only; similar com-
promises were enacted concerning presumptions and competency. See FED. R. EvID. 302,
601.
14. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
15. "The formulation adopted by the House [and ultimately by the Congress] is
pregnant with litigious mischief." SENATE REPORT 12. See also Moore & Bendix, Congress,
Evidence and Rulemaking, 84 YALE L.J. 9 (1974); Weinberg, supra note 6.
16. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970), making the
United States liable for acts of its employees under circumstances where a private per-
son would be liable to the claimant "in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred"; 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1970), adopting nonconflicting state
criminal law in areas subject to the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.
17. See, e.g., CT. CL. R. 61(b) (capacity to sue or be sued in Court of Claims is
determined by the law of the state of domicile).
18. Under UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966), pendant jurisdiction may be
exercised whenever the state and federal claims "derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact" such that a plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to try them all in
one judicial proceeding." Considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness
to litigants are guides to the trial court in accepting or denying pendant jurisdiction.
Id. at 726. When the Gibbs conditions are met, severance would work a hardship on
one or both litigants and on the court system as a whole.
Similar problems arise under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Some claims,
such as compulsory counterclaims under Rule 13(a), must be litigated or lost; severance
is not possible in such cases. Where litigation becomes more complex, and additional
parties and claims are joined, the court may consolidate or sever based on considerations
of prejudice, convenience, and delay. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b), 20(b), 21. Foreseeable
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troversy may arise as to whether contested matter is an "element of a
claim or defense," or something less, a mere "item of proof."'19 How
federal courts will resolve this problem is a matter of conjecture; 21
hence the discrepancies between federal and Florida law in the follow-
ing areas are critical.
A. Presumptions
Under Federal Rule 301 courts must apply the "bursting bubble"
theory of presumptions in all civil cases not otherwise provided for
by statute or rule. That theory imposes the burden of going forward
with the evidence on the party against whom the presumption is di-
rected. It does not shift the burden of proof. Florida law is generally
in accord,21 but there are occasional cases in which the presumption
shifts the burden of proof. Examples include legitimacy of birth, 22
sanity in civil actions,21 and the good faith and propriety of acts of
public officials. 24 In varying degrees the Florida courts have appeared
to require proof to overcome these presumptions; to that extent
Florida law conflicts with the Federal Rule.
evidentiary problems could enter into the court's determination, but should not govern
it. Further, the severance-consolidation question must be resolved by the court with the
aid of the parties, in the absence of witnesses who, when called to testify, may wish to
invoke a state or federal privilege.
19. SENATE REPORT 12.
20. Logical alternatives include: (1) when in doubt, use the rule supplied by federal
law; (2) when in doubt, use the rule supplied by state law; (3) use federal law unless
it conflicts with a strong state policy; (4) use state law unless it conflicts with a strong
federal policy; (5) use the law of the forum which supplies the rule as to the "main
substantive issue" of the case; (6) apply federal law to "insignificant" matters, state
law to "dispositive" matters; (7) decide each case along lines of fundamental fairness
to the parties. These suggestions have been listed in more or less declining order of
uniformity and simplicity. Any standard of fundamental fairness demands some con-
sideration of these criteria. There is some discussion of these matters in Rothstein, The
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 125, 138-39 (1973),
and Weinstein, supra note 11, at 376.
21. Leonetti v. Boone, 74 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1954). Fla. H.R. 471 § 1 (1975) (§§ 90.302-
.304) would retain both types of presumptions. Those that shift the burden of proof
are those otherwise provided by statute and those which implement public policy. Pre-
sumptions of a mere procedural or ordering nature would shift only the burden of pro-
ducing evidence.
22. Eldridge v. Eldridge, 16 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1944).
23. Schaefer v. Voyle, 102 So. 7 (Fla. 1924). Once a person is adjudicated insane,
there arises a presumption that shifts the burden of proof to one alleging sanity. Wells
v. State, 98 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 1957). Where mental condition fluctuates, the presumption
of sanity obtains. Alexander v. Estate of Callahan, 132 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1961).
24. Cf. Wester v. Belote, 138 So. 721 (Fla. 1931); Yonge v. Askew, 293 So. 2d 395 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Hillsborough County Aviation Auth. v. Taller & Cooper, Inc.,
245 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
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B. Privileges
The Proposed Federal Rules sought to replace the existing chame-
leon-like federal privilege law25 with eight privileges that were to
apply uniformly in all federal cases.2 6 Congress rejected this approach.
Federal Rule 501 refers federal courts to statutes and case law, except
where state law supplies the rule with respect to an element of a claim
or defense. Currently recognized federal privileges based on statutes
and case law include attorney-client communications,2 7 governmental
reports,2 8 husband-wife communications,2 9 communications to clergy,"
25. Federal evidence law prior to the Rules was governed by statutes and case law,
especially Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a). See
Weinstein, supra note 11, at 353-56. In adopting the Proposed Rules of Evidence, the
Supreme Court amended FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a) to incorporate the new Rules. 56 F.R.D.
355, 356 (1972).
Rule 43(a) formerly read in pertinent part (emphasis added):
All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the statutes of the
United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in the courts
of the United States on the hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of
evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the
United States court is held. In any case, the statute or rule which favors the
reception of evidence governs ....
Rule 43(a) provided a comfortable, if nonuniform, approach to evidence admissibility.
Obviously decisions under this rule varied among federal trial courts. New Rule 43(a)
merely connects the Rules of Evidence with the Rules of Civil Procedure.
26. See PROP. FrD. R. EvID. 503 (attorney-client), 504 (psychotherapist-patient), 505
(husband-wife), 506 (communications to clergy), 507 (political vote), 508 (trade secrets),
509 (state secrets and official information), 510 (informer), 56 F.R.D. 183, 235-258 (1972).
27. Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353 (1891).
28. For reasons of public policy, a number of existing federal statutes grant privileges
to required reports. See, e.g., 13 U.S.C. § 9(a) (1970) (census reports); 42 U.S.C. § 260(d)
(1970) (prohibiting use of hospital admission or treatment records against one volun-
tarily hospitalized for addiction); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. II1, 1973) (Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity conciliation proceedings); 42 U.S.C. § 2240 (1970), 45 U.S.C. §§
33, 41 (1970), and 49 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (1970) (accident or incident reports from nuclear
facilities, railroads, and Civil Aeronautics Board investigations, respectively). Interagency
communications concerning the merits of claims and courses of conduct enjoy a qualified
privilege which prevails in the absence of special circumstances. Davis v. Braswell Motor
Freight Lines, Inc., 363 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1966). Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974).
29. The federal interspousal privilege is broad. Sometimes it has been treated as
a competency issue. See United States v. Armstrong, 476 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Fields, 458 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 927 (1973). Other
cases have treated it as a privilege. See Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525 (1960).
In any event, spouses may testify for, but not against, each other. Certain exceptions
exist, as in cases where the witness is a victim, and in Mann Act prosecutions. See id.
The privilege may be invoked by either party or witness. Id. It extends to confidential
communications but not to acts. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954).
30. Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
Like federal law, Florida law privileges communications to clergy. FLA. STAT. §
90.241 (1973). This privilege would be retained in Fla. H.R. 471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.505).
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trade secrets, 1 state secrets, 2 and informants' identities. 3 Political
votes may be privileged; the issue does not seem to have been litigated.
No generally recognized privileges exist for newsmen 34 or accountants;33
state privileges for communications to physicians" and psycho-
therapists37 have been honored only when Erie R.R. v. Tompkins38 is
applicable.
How does Florida law differ? Statutes privilege communications
to psychiatrists, 39 psychologists,4  and accountants.4 1 Accident reports
and blood alcohol tests are also statutorily privileged;42 this privilege
31. E.I. Dupont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917). See also
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7) (protective orders-trade secrets); 15 U.S.C. § 78x(a) (1970) (Se-
curities and Exchange Commission privilege not to reveal trade secrets).
32. Military secrets are protected by case law, United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S.
1 (1953); by statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-94 (1970) (forbidding gathering, transmitting, or
losing defense information); and by the Constitution, art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (treason). Cf.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (executive privilege). A privilege for diplo-
matic secrets may be recognized. See Republic of China v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.,
142 F. Supp. 551 (D. Md. 1956).
33. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). Florida recognized this privilege
in State v. Matney, 236 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
34. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). At least five Justices, however, found
a limited privilege when, for example, the disclosure was not sought in good faith. See
id. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
35. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
36. There is no federally created physician-patient privilege. The privilege may,
however, be recognized in diversity cases by applying the law of a forum that recognizes
the privilege. Cf. Barnes v. United States, 374 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 917 (1967).
37. A situation comparable to the physician-patient privilege, see note 36 supra,
,exists as to this privilege; it may be applied in diversity cases where state law
recognizes it. Cf. Fitzgerald v. A.L Burbank & Co., 451 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1971). Pre-
sumably, then, the Federal Rules will present only minor interference, if any, with
Florida's statutory psychiatrist and psychologist privileges. See FLA. STAT. §§ 90.242,
490.32 (1973). As Florida recognizes no physician-patient privilege, no conflict can arise
there. Florida Power 8 Light Co. v. Bridgeman, 182 So. 911 (Fla. 1938).
38. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See note 12 supra.
39. FLA. STAT. § 90.242 (1973). This privilege would be retained by Fla. H.R. 471
§ 1 (1975) (§ 90.503).
40. FLA. STAT. § 490.32 (1973). This privilege would be retained by Fla. H.R.
471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.503).
41. FLA. STAT. § 473.141 (1973). This privilege is not included in the proposed
codification, Fla. H.R. 471 (1975). The privilege has been held inapplicable in federal
administrative income tax proceedings. Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
42. FLA. STAT. § 316.066(4) (1973). This statute applies to required blood alcohol
tests as well as verbal communications. Cannon v. Giddens, 210 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1968).
But see Timmons v. State, 214 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1968), cert. denied,
222 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 1969) (consensual blood alcohol test results admissible if obtained
by officer not investigating accident). This privilege is not mentioned in the proposed
code, Fla. H.R. 471 (1975), but might be retained as part of the state traffic law, FLA.
STAT. §§ 316.001-.292 (1973). The accident report. privilege is strictly construed and
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has been recognized in one federal case.43 The Florida interspousal
privilege is narrowly drawn, covering only confidential communications
between married persons.4 4 The trade secret and state secret privileges
are only tenuously established in this state's courts.45 In view of federal
courts' general rejection of the privileges for accountants, accident re-
ports, and blood alcohol tests, these matters are likely to create
troublesome conflicts.
C. Competency
Federal Rule 601 declares every person to be a competent witness,
except as elsewhere provided in the Rules or where state law supplies
the rule of decision with respect to an element of a claim or defense.
Other pertinent Federal Rules require only that the witness have
personal knowledge of the subject matter, take an oath or affirmation,
and not be the presiding judge or a jury member.4 6
Florida law is more traditional. The state bars testimony by in-
fants and mental defectives who have insufficient intelligence or sense
of obligation to tell the truth.4 7 Where competency is at issue, ap-
pellate courts rarely find error in trial courts' exercise of discretion.
The most troublesome difference in the competency area is Florida's
Deadman's Statute.48 With certain exceptions, it bars the testimony of
applies only to information that is taken for the purpose of making the report and
that forms the basis of the report. State v. Mitchell, 245 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1971).
The admissibility of breath alcohol tests is governed by FLA. STAT. §§ 322.261-.262
(Supp. 1974).
43. Kuklis v. Hancock, 428 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1970). See Krizak v. W.C.
Brooks & Sons, Inc., 320 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1963). The Kuklis court found, however, that the
statute did not encompass the evidence at issue.
44. The Florida interspousal privilege encompasses confidential communications.
Brown v. May, 76 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1954). The privilege does not encompass actions,
transactions, or nonconfidential communications. Ross v. State, 202 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1967). Spouses are competent to testify for or against one another. FLA.
STAT. § 90.04 (1973).
45. See Note, Protection of Trade Secrets in Florida: Are Present Remedies Ade-
quate?, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 721 (1972). A trade-secret privilege is included in Fla. H.R.
471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.506). In regard to state secrets, see Patterson v. Tribune Co., 146
So. 2d 623 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962), cert. denied, 153 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1963), recogniz-
ing but not defining the privilege except in terms of "public policy," and the Florida
Public Records Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 119.01, .07 (1973).
46. See FED. R. EvID. 602, 603, 605, 606(a).
47. With regard to infants, see Bell v. State, 93 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1957), and Harrold
v. Schluep, 264 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972), Considered together, these
cases suggest that children will rarely be found incompetent. But see Miller v. State,
233 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970). With regard to mental defectives, see
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Robinson, 68 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1953). A witness under
the influence of drugs may also be incompetent. See Collie v. State, 267 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
48. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1973). The proposed Florida code limits the statute to "oral
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a party or interested person as to communications or transactions with
a decedent or insane person in a claim against that person's personal
representative, heir, survivor, or beneficiary. The Deadman's Statute
can affect outcomes dramatically, and, although federal courts have
occasionally applied it,49 the statute may encourage forum shopping
in the future.
Florida courts have not ruled on the competency of judges and
jurors to act as witnesses in cases they are trying, although a statute
provides that any juror who is a prospective witness may be challenged
for cause. 50 Fundamental fairness would seem to require a finding of
incompetency.
Federal Rule 606(b) limits the competence of jurors to impeach
their own verdict to instances where the jury has been exposed to
extraneous prejudicial information or improper outside influence.
This limitation effectively precludes impeachment of "quotient ver-
dicts," in which jurors have bound themselves to determine a verdict
by average.5 1 Congress apparently sought to reduce juror harassment
and exploitation after trial. Florida law is generally in accord with




In summary, Congress decided that, in the majority of cases where
a choice of forum is available, differences between state and federal
law should be minimized. Therefore, only when the phrase "civil
actions and proceedings with respect to an element of a claim or de-
fense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision" cannot readily
be defined are there likely to be choice of law problems. Considerations
of comity and the constitutional requirements of Erie prevailed in
the House of Representatives revision, and ultimately in the Rules
communications," thus allowing testimony as to "transactions." Fla. H.R. 471 § 1 (1975)
(§ 90.602(1)). For commentary explaining and recommending this change, see Ehrhardt,
supra note 8, at 702-06.
49. See Stricker v. Morgan, 268 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 963
(1960). The problem, as discussed in notes 16-21 and accompanying text supra, is whether
Federal Rule 601 now limits this rule of incompetency to diversity cases such as
Stricker, or whether it may be invoked in actions not based solely on diversity.
50. FLA. STAT. § 913.03(11) (1973).
51. The House of Representatives would have allowed juror impeachment where
the verdict was arrived at by a binding quotient process, or where a juror was intoxicated.
HOUSE REPORT 9-10. This version was rejected in conference. CONFERENCE REPORT 8.
52. City of Miami v. Bopp, 158 So. 89 (Fla. 1934).
53. Magid v. Mozo, 135 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
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themselves.5 4 This course sacrificed some uniformity, for application
of these Rules will now differ from state to state, from case to case,
and possibly within a case. Propriety of venue, personal jurisdiction,
and joinder may now be more hotly contested. The burden on federal
judges to select the applicable rule will be substantial. Finally, the
opportunity to fashion an exemplary set of federal rules, at least in
the privilege area, is lost for the time being.
III. JUDICIAL INITIATIVE
Federal trial courts have far more power than their Florida counter-
parts to take the initiative in presenting and determining facts.55 Pre-
sumably this initiative is used to streamline the trial process, fill inter-
stices in testimony, clarify issues, and do substantial justice. If abused,
it could jeopardize the trial's adversary nature, and the pages of Federal
Reporter would billow with appeals. Federal judges' established power
to summarize and comment on the evidence 6 has not created noticeable
problems. Florida judges have no such power.57 The Rules give federal
courts particular clout in the areas of judicial notice" and the appoint-
ment of expert witnesses. 59 These three powers can make the court a
formidable participant in the trial process.
Judicial notice in Florida and federal forums differs in several
respects. In federal civil cases judicial notice, once exercised, is con-
clusive; the jury must accept the court's finding. 60 In federal criminal
cases, Congress has required an instruction that the jury is not bound
54. See HOUSE REPORT 8-9; CONFERENCE REPORT 7-8.
55. This discrepancy between federal and Florida courts may reflect heightened
confidence in the federal judiciary. One survey revealed that greater confidence in the
independence and judicial temperament of the federal bench was the fourth most
common of 14 factors cited by attorneys who had chosen the federal forum. The first
three factors were geographical concerns, better pretrial discovery, and higher verdicts.
Summers, Analysis of Factors That Influence Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases, 47
IOWA L. REV. 933, 937 (1962).
56. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899). PROP. FED. R. EVD. 105 would
have explicitly permitted summation and commentary; its deletion by the House
of Representatives left the Hof decision intact. See HOUSE REPORT 5, SENATE REPORT 24.
57. Raulerson v. State, 102 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1958). The proposed Florida code does
not give trial judges the power to summarize and comment on the evidence. See Fla.
H.R. 471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.106).
58. FED. R. EvID. 201.
59. FmI. R. EVID. 614.
60. FED. R. Evm. 201(g). Subsection (e) allows the opposing party to be heard
prior to the taking of notice, or afterwards in the absence of prior notification, but these
arguments do not reach the jury. Perhaps the opportunity to rebut before the jury is
insignificant, since any judicially noticed fact must be "not subject to reasonable dispute."
FED. R. EvID. 201(b).
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to accept judicially noticed facts as conclusive. 61 The Federal Rule,
however, has no provision allowing the party disputing a noticed fact
in a criminal proceeding the opportunity to rebut before the jury.6 2
In Florida cases, civil and criminal, the opponent may offer rebuttal
even after judicial notice, and the jury may reject the court's finding.6
Federal Rule 201(b) encompasses what is "generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction," and facts "capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned." The plain language of the rule suggests that all
authoritative sources-such as almanacs, atlases, treatises, business
records-may be consulted and facts therein irrebuttably noticed even
if those facts are not "generally known." Florida cases generally limit
judicial notice to what is "commonly known."6' 4 State courts are ad-
ditionally handicapped by appellate courts' reluctance to sanction
judicial notice in some areas, and a lack of litigation in others. Among
the troublesome areas are municipal ordinances, which cannot be
noticed in state courts not charged with enforcing them,- county
records required by law,66 and rules and regulations of state agencies. 67
Federal courts may appoint their own expert witnesses, and may
reveal to the jury that they are court appointed.68 Such witnesses may
then be cross-examined by either party. 69 The extent to which Florida
61. FED. R. EVIl. 201(g). See also HousE REPORT 6-7, citing the sixth amendment as
the basis for treating criminal cases differently.
62. Nonetheless, the sixth amendment's jury trial guarantee arguably requires that
a criminal defendant be given the opportunity to rebut judicially noticed facts before
the jury. Cf. HOUSE REPORT 6-7; PROP. FED. R. EvID. 201(g), Advisory Committee Note, 46
F.R.D. 161, 208 (1969).
63. Makos v. Prince, 64 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1953). The proposed Florida code requires
facts judicially noticed to be accepted by the jury. It does not differentiate civil and
criminal cases. Fla. H.R. 471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.206).
64. Amos v. Moseley, 77 So. 619 (Fla. 1917), established this phrase, which has
been honored ever since by cases defining notice in terms of what is "known." See
Wyatt v. State, 270 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972). Cf. Roberts v. Wofford
Beach Hotel, 67 So. 2d 670, 672 (Fla. 1953), restricting judicial notice of scientific facts
to "matters of universal notoriety and general understanding." Perhaps the only excep-
tion to the "commonly known" rule occurs when Florida courts take notice of census
data. Yoo Kun Wha v. Kelly, 154 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1963). The proposed code allows
notice of facts "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fla. H.R. 471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.202(12)).
65. Holmes v. State, 273 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1972). Fla. H.R. 471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.202(10))
would permit ordinances to be noticed if available in printed or certified copies.
66. Livingston v. State, 145 So. 761 (Fla. 1933) (specifically rejecting judicial notice).
67. Freimuth v. State, 272 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1972), allows notice of the Federal
Register, but there seem to be no cases allowing notice of the Florida Administrative
Code. Fla. H.R. 471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.202(3), (9)) would allow notice of both.
68. FED. R. EvID. 706(a), (c).
69. FED. R. Eves. 706(a).
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courts enjoy these powers is unclear.7 0 The Advisory Committee note
to Proposed Federal Rule 706 suggests that although the power to
appoint expert witnesses may rarely be used, it could have a subtle re-
straining effect on the parties' own use of experts.7 '
Federal courts' latitude in the areas of judicial notice, appointment
of expert witnesses, and summation of evidence is paralleled in other
areas. For instance, federal case law72 has long recognized curative ad-
missibility as an appropriate tool with which to redress undue prejudice
created by improper evidence previously admitted, and the Federal
Rules provide an open-ended exception to the hearsay rule.7 3 Neither
curative admissibility nor an open-ended hearsay exception is recognized
in Florida.
IV. IMPEACHMENT
Cross-examination in both federal and Florida courts is limited
to the scope of the preceding direct examination, except where the
court in its discretion permits greater latitude, and to impeachment. 74
Although Congress rejected a proposed rule which would have expand-
ed the scope of cross-examination to any relevant subject,' 5 it retained
broad impeachment provisions. Federal and Florida law differ as to
who may impeach, by what kinds of evidence, under what conditions,
and with what effect. Possibly the more open federal law reflects not
only a greater skepticism about testimony and witnesses, but a greater
faith in the jury's sophistication and resistance to prejudice.
In Florida a party may only impeach his own witness after show-
ing that he is surprised and adversely affected by the witness' testi-
70. Florida courts may appoint experts in eminent domain proceedings, but cross-
examination by the parties is not allowed, nor is revealing that the witness is court-
appointed. Rochelle v. State Road Dept., 196 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967). It is
unclear whether Rochelle applies to civil actions generally. Court-appointed experts are
common in criminal proceedings, however, and cross-examination by either party is
allowed. See Brown v. State, 108 So. 842 (Fla. 1926). The proposed Florida code does
not mention the court's power to appoint experts, but does allow a court to call
witnesses on its own motion. The code further provides that such witnesses may be
cross-examined by any party. Fla. H.R. 471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.615).
71. PROP. FED. R. EvID. 706, Advisory Committee Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 287 (1973).
72. See cases cited in 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 15, at 307 n.3 (3d ed. 1940), at 77
n.3 (Supp. 1975).
73. FED. R. Evm. 803(24), 804(b)(5). See note 118 and accompanying text infra.
74. See, e.g., Statewright v. State, 278 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973), rev'd
on other grounds, 300 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1974); FED. R. EvID. 611(b).
75. PROP. FED. R. EvID. 611(b), 56 F.R.D. 183, 273 (1972), allowed examination on
"any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility," unless limited by the
court. The House returned to the traditional rule to facilitate orderly presentation.
HOUSE REPORT 12.
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mony.76 If those conditions are met, the calling party may impeach
by prior inconsistent statement, but not by character evidence; he is
held to vouch for his witness' good character. 77 The Federal Rules
allow impeachment by any party without preconditions, and by any
method generally permissible.78 The Rules thus allow much greater
use of prior statements. No showing of adversity or surprise is re-
quired; the prior inconsistent statement may even be used when the
witness is unable to recall the event in question. This ability to make
greater use of prior statements is of great moment, especially when
they may be used substantively as well as to impeach.79
Before using a prior statement to impeach, counsel is required by
Florida law to show the statement to the witness.8 0 Federal Rule 613
requires only that the statement be shown to opposing counsel on de-
mand. The Florida procedure lessens the questioning attorney's ad-
vantage over the witness and possibly makes impeachment more diffi-
cult.
The Federal Rules are also more relaxed on the subject of
character impeachment. It may be accomplished by showing either a
trait of untruthfulness or prior conviction of a crime; other character
evidence is considered irrelevant. 81 Attacking character for truthfulness
may be accomplished by inquiring into reputation, opinion, or, on
cross-examination, specific instances of conduct involving truthfulness
or untruthfulness . 2 Florida law allows character impeachment by repu-
tation evidence only. 3 It is more receptive to impeachment by criminal
conviction, however; the state courts admit evidence of any conviction,
76. See FLA. STAT. § 90.09 (1973). The surprise requirement is not mentioned in
the statute, but was noted in Hernandez v. State, 22 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 1945). The pro-
posed code would eliminate the surprise requirement. Fla. H.R. 471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.608
(2)).
77. Hernandez v. State, 22 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 1945); FLA. STAT. § 90.09 (1973). This
rule would not be changed by the proposed code. See Fla. H.R. 471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.608(2)).
78. FED. R. EVD. 607-09, 613.
79. Florida law excludes prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence of a
fact not otherwise shown. Tomlinson v. Peninsular Naval Stores Co., 55 So. 548 (Fla.
1911). Wallace v. Rashkow, 270 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972), is the only
case allowing substantive use of a prior inconsistent statement to corroborate independent
evidence. This case is discussed in Ehrhardt, supra note 8, at 685-87. Compare FED. R.
EVID. 801(d)(l), allowing substantive use of the prior statement if it was given under
oath in a trial, hearing, or deposition. PROP. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1), 56 F.R.D. 183, 293
(1972), would have allowed substantive use of any prior inconsistent statement, regardless
of the setting, House REPORT 13, as would Fla. H.R. 471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.801(4)(a)).
80. FLA. STAT. § 90.09 (1973).
81. FED. R. EVD. 404, 608-09. Florida law is in accord. Taylor v. State, 190 So.
691 (Fla. 1939).
82. FED. R. EVD. 608.
83. Taylor v. State, 190 So. 691 (Fla. 1939); FLA. STAT. § 90.08 (1973).
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felony or misdemeanor, and allow remoteness to be brought out only
on redirect.8 4 Federal law is much more strict: the crime must be a
felony or involve dishonesty or false statement; the conviction (or re-
lease from confinement) must be less than 10 years old unless the
court finds admission to be in the interests of justice and notice is
given the adverse party; pardoned crimes are not admissible; and
evidence of juvenile adjudications is frowned upon. 5
Under the Federal Rules, evidence of habit and routine practice
may be used to prove conformity therewith on a particular occasion."
Since the habit involved may concern some trait other than truthful-
ness, this method of proof may prove useful in areas other than im-
peachment. For example, a party's habitual negligent practice can be
introduced to show negligence on a particular occasion; such evidence
could be decisive. The Federal Rules are also more lenient about the-
introduction of evidence of character traits, other than for untruthful-
ness, of the victim of a sex crime.8 7
V. HEARSAY
One commentator, in discussing Florida's approach to hearsay, felt
the rule to be "I know hearsay when I see it and this is hearsay."' ,
This condemnation is probably overstated, but ad hoc rulemaking
84. FLA. STAT. § 90.08 (1973). The procedure for impeaching by prior conviction,
including rebuttal use of mitigating circumstances, is outlined in McArthur v. Cook,
99 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1957). The proposed code adopts the more restrictive federal approach.
Fla. H.R. 471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.610).
85. FED. R. EvID. 609(a)-(d). Congress evidently did not intend much use to be
made of stale convictions. See SENATE REPORT 15. Use of a juvenile adjudication for im-
peachment does not seem to have been litigated in Florida, perhaps because of the
juvenile records privilege, FLA. STAT. § 39.12(4) (1973).
86. FED. R. Evm. 406. This Rule is particularly liberal, requiring no personal
knowledge or corroboration. Most states do not allow use of habit evidence. 29 AM. JUR.
2d Evidence § 303 (1967). Florida law generally agrees with the majority. See General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 238 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1970). But cf. State v. Wadsworth, 210 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1968), allowing the trial
court discretion to admit evidence of prospensity to intemperance as corroborating
evidence of intoxication at the time of the crime. The Wadsworth case was decided
by a panel of seven justices, two of whom were sitting by leave from lower courts, and
two more of whom dissented from the holding. Wadsworth has never been expressly
followed. The proposed Florida code allows use of routine practice of an organization,
but not habit. Fla. H.R. 471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.406).
87. Compare FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(2), allowing the accused to offer character evidence
of a pertinent trait of the victim, with FLA. STAT. § 794.022(2) (Supp. 1974), barring
testimony about prior sex acts with persons other than the accused unless previously
shown to constitute a behavior pattern that is relevant to the issue of consent.
88. Urich, 1970-1971 Survey of Florida Law, Evidence, 26 U. MIAMI L. REV. 147, 176
(1971). Urich points out that there are inconsistencies among the districts, and that
compartmentalization of exceptions may not always be possible. Id. at 177.
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seems to have left more gaps, confusion, and other evils in hearsay
than in other areas of evidence. Presumably Florida trial courts resolve
the less commonly contested hearsay questions by referring to the
general common law, and may reach results in accord with federal
law without being fastidious about terminology. This section will
concentrate on the substantive differences between federal and Florida
hearsay rules.
Federal Rule 801(d) defines certain statements as "not hearsay,"
thereby making them admissible as substantive evidence. Subsection
(1) includes within this category a testifying witness' prior inconsistent
statements given under oath in a proceeding or deposition, and his
prior consistent statements offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrica-
tion or improper motive. Florida law permits use of prior inconsistent
statements to impeach, but not to prove the truth of facts not other-
wise supported. 9 Subsection (2) of the Federal Rule includes admis-
sions by a party-opponent as "not hearsay" when offered against the
declaring party. Florida law is in accord, although it does not always
specify whether such admissions are an exception to the hearsay rule
or are "not hearsay,"90 and sometimes confuses party admissions with
non-party declarations. 91
Two minor discrepancies deserve mention here. First, Federal
Rule 801(a) defines as a statement, and thereby subjects to the hearsay
rule, conduct "intended . . . as an assertion." Arguably silence may
never be "intended . . . as an assertion." Both Florida and federal
courts have treated silence, when circumstances warrant a statement,
89. Tomlinson v. Peninsular Naval Stores Co., 55 So. 548 (Fla. 1911). See also
Wallace v. Rashkow, 270 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972). The proposed Florida
code is even broader than the Federal Rule, admitting as "not hearsay" any prior
inconsistent statement if the declarant testifies. Fla. H.R. 471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.801(4)).
90. McKay v. Perry, 286 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973), calls the admission
an exception. More commonly, courts do not attempt to classify admissions. See, e.g.,
Lowe v. Shearer, 239 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
91. In the accepted terminology, the word "admissions" refers to statements by
parties or those with whom they are in privity, while "declarations" refers to state-
ments by nonparties. See FEo. R. EviD. 801, 804; C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 276 (2d ed.
1972). Florida courts have not always used accepted terminology, however. See Sea-
board Coast Line R.R. v. Nieuwendaal, 253 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1971),
cert. denied, 262 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1972). Florida cases once appeared to decide admissibility
questions on the basis of whether a party admission was self-serving or disserving. See 13
FLA. JuR. Evidence § 218 (1957); S. GARD, FLORIDA EVIDENCE RULES 178-79, at 268-71 (1967).
It now appears that motive or result at the time of the statement is irrelevant, provided
the statement is offered against its maker. DeLong v. Williams, 232 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Wilkinson v. Grover, 181 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
This approach is in accord with FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2). The proposed Florida code
treats admissions and declarations against interest as separate exceptions to the hearsay
rule. Fla. H.R. 471 § 1 (1975) (§§ 90.803(18), .804(2)(c)).
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as an admission that may be entered in evidence.92 The wording of
the Federal Rule may take silence out of the hearsay rule completely.9 3
Secondly, the leading Florida case held opinion survey results to be
hearsay based on hearsay, and hence inadmissible to support a motion
for a change of venue.94 Of course, survey results would not be hearsay
if offered to prove matters other than the truth of matters asserted by
the parties polled. If hearsay, the results might still be admissible under
Federal Rule 803(6) (records of any regularly conducted activity);
(8) (public records); (17) (market reports); or (24) (other excep-
tions). Survey results might also be admissible under Federal Rule 703,
if the witness testifies as an expert and the supporting facts are of a
type reasonably relied on by his colleagues in the field.
"Res gestae" is a term so carelessly used that a generation of legal
scholars has urged its abolition.9 Florida courts have sometimes joined
in this criticism.96 Nevertheless, the phrase is commonplace in state
decisions, which have given it multifarious meanings.", The Federal
Rules make no mention of the term, substituting therefor three more
92. See Smith v. Allen, 297 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1961); Sullivan v. McMillan, 8 So. 450
(Fla. 1890).
93. In any case, silence will only be admissible if it is relevant and not unduly pre-
judicial. See FED. R. EvID. 401-03. Moreover, an accused's exercise of his right to remain
silent may not be used against him in a criminal proceeding. U.S. CONST. amend. V.;
United States v. Ghiz, 491 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Mullings, 364 F.2d
173 (2d Cir. 1966); but see United States v. Harris, 388 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1967).
94. Irvin v. State, 66 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 927 (1954). The
court also suggested that survey results might be incompetent. Id. at 292.
95. See 6 J. WIcmom, EVIDENCE § 1767 (3d ed. 1940); Morgan, The Law of Evidence,
1941-1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 481 (1946). See also C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 288 (2d ed.
1972).
96. See Williams v. State, 188 So. 2d 320, 323 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966), quoting J.
WIGMORE, supra note 95. This case was modified by the Supreme Court of Florida,
however, in an opinion by Justice Roberts that used the term "res gestac" without any
indication of disapproval. State v. Williams, 198 So. 2d 21, 23 (Fla. 1967). The Supreme
Court of Florida had previously recognized problems caused by use of the term. See
Green v. State, 113 So. 121, 123 (Fla. 1927).
97. Florida courts have been imaginative in defining "res gestae." See, e.g., Gillette
v. State, 6 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1942) (evidence of sodomy); State Board of Funeral Di-
rectors & Embalmers v. Cooksey, 3 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 1941) (conduct of funeral director
in changing casket and clothing of deceased); Thornton v. State, 196 So. 842 (Fla.
1940) (fact of being an escaping convict); Powell v. State, 175 So. 213 (Fla. 1937) (cir-
cumstances surrounding death of a co-victim); Browne v. State, 109 So. 811 (Fla. 1926)
(clothes worn by the deceased). All of the above refer to nonassertive conduct or to
circumstances, and not to "statements" subject to the hearsay rule; they might con-
ceivably have been admissible without any reference to "res gestae." This may account
for the fact that none of these cases has ever been overTuled, questioned, distinguished, or
explained. Florida courts continue to use "res gestae" in reference to acts as well as
statements. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 311 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
400 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.3:384
precise hearsay exceptions: present sense impressions; excited ut-
terances; and then-existing mental, emotional, or physical conditions.
9 8
Federal Rule 803(4) admits statements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis and treatment, including statements regarding causation in-
sofar as relevant to diagnosis or treatment. Logically this would include
statements to paramedics and nurses. Florida law is more restrictive.
Unless they are "res gestae," prior statements as to causation are inad-
missible if offered on behalf of the party making the statement.9
Statements to nurses and paramedics have not been covered by Florida
case law, although they may be admissible as statements of existing
physical condition. The chief difference from the Federal Rule, how-
ever, is that Florida excludes testimony of examining physicians (as
opposed to treating physicians) that is based even partly on the pa-
tient's own relation of his case history.10
Arguably, the absence of an entry in records of a regularly con-
ducted activity can never be hearsay, since it is only circumstantial
evidence that an event which normally would be recorded did not
occur. Stated otherwise, absence of an entry cannot evidence the truth
of the matter asserted because there is no assertion. Federal Rule 803(7)
has settled the question, however, by making such absence an exception
to the hearsay rule. Florida courts do not seem to have considered the
matter.'
Federal Rule 803(8)(c) renders admissible in civil cases factual
findings of public investigations, and in criminal cases findings against
the government, unless sources or circumstances indicate a lack of
trustworthiness. Florida law allows use of required accident reports
for impeachment purposes, 02 but not as substantive evidence.' 0 3 This
98. FED. R. EVID. 803(l)-(3). The proposed Florida code adopts the same approach.
Fla. H.R. 471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.803(1)-(3)).
99. Wilkinson v. Grover, 181 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965). Fla. H.R.
471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.803(4)) would admit statements as to the general character or
external source of the cause offered on behalf of either party.
100. Marshall v. Papineau, 132 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1961). See also
Bondy v. West, 219 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (examining doctor may
testify if the testimony is based solely on his own observations). The rule was relaxed
in a recent case, Marine Exploration Co. v. McCoy, 308 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1975). Fla. H.R. 471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.803(4)) retains the distinction between
examining and treating physicians; that section requires the declarant to be seeking
diagnosis or treatment.
101. Fla. H.R. 471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.803(7), (10)) utilizes the language of the Federal
Rule.
102. State v. Johnson, 284 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1973), allows use of a police report for
impeachment when the report is critical, deals with a vital point, is reasonably ex-
culpatory, and has been reviewed in camera for improper matter.
103. FLA. STAT. § 316.066(4) (1973). See Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Zufelt, 280 So. 2d
723 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973). See also FLA. STAT. § 322.261(l)(b)(1) (Supp. 1974). For
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difference is potentially outcome determinative in interstate traffic
accident litigation.
Federal Rule 803(16) allows "ancient" documents to be admitted
once 20 years old. Florida adheres to the common law 30-year rule,1
0 4
with certain statutory exceptions for judgments and decrees of record,
and for deeds and powers of attorney, all of which are "ancient" after
20 years." 5
Prior convictions of crimes punishable by death or imprisonment
in excess of one year may be admitted in civil proceedings under
Federal Rule 803(22). The Rule reaches all such convictions not based
on a plea of nolo contendere. Florida law on this subject is inconsistent
and illogical. A conviction based on a guilty plea is allowed as an ad-
mission, but convictions are not otherwise admissible in civil pro-
ceedings as substantive evidence. 0 6 The wisdom of the Florida ap-
proach is questionable in light of the need for plea bargaining. Further-
more, a conviction over 20 years old may be admissible as an ancient
judgment under section 92.07, Florida Statutes.
Statements in a learned treatise are admissible under Federal Rule
803(18) if a witness' testimony or admission establishes the treatise
as an authority, if other expert testimony so establishes, or if judicial
notice is taken of the treatise's reliability. Thus it is fairly easy to
admit treatise materials as substantive evidence. In Florida, statements
in learned treatises cannot be used as substantive evidence, and may
be used for impeachment only when the treatise is recognized as au-
thoritative by the witness whose testimony is to be impeached.'
When the declarant is unavailable, Federal Rule 804 provides an
additional set of exceptions. Under subsection (a), a witness is un-
available if he is exempted from testifying on grounds of privilege,
refuses to testify, claims lack of memory, 08 cannot be present or testify
due to sickness or death, or is beyond process and unwilling to appear.
If these criteria are met, five types of statements may be admitted:
former testimony, statements under belief of impending death, state-
material concerning federal treatment of government reports, see PROP. FED. R. EVID.
502, 509, 803(8), Advisory Committee Notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 235, 252-54, 311-13 (1972).
104. Drake v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 227 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
Fla. H.R. 471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.803(16)) adopts the 20-year rule.
105. FLA. STAT. §§ 92.07, .08 (1973).
106. Boshnack v. World Wide Rent-A-Car, Inc., 195 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1967).
107. Eggart v. State, 25 So. 144 (Fla. 1898); City of St. Petersburg v. Ferguson,
193 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966). The proposed Florida code contains no
provisions on learned treatises.
108. The court may, however, choose not to believe the witness. HousE REPORT 15,
citing United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
This qualification gives tremendous latitude to the trial court.
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ments against interest, statements of personal or family history, and
other (unspecified) statements. Florida's criteria for unavailability are
nonuniform. For former testimony 09 the courts have recognized
death,11° whereabouts unknown,"' insanity and infirmity12 and
diminished memory.1 1 3 Florida allows statements under belief of im-
pending death only where the declarant has died. 1 4 Unavailability
requirements are not clear for statements against interest."5
Florida restricts the use of declarant-unavailable hearsay in ad-
ditional respects. Federal Rule 804(b)(2) allows statements under be-
lief of impending death in homicide prosecutions and civil cases;
Florida allows them only in homicide cases." 0 Federal Rule 804(b)(3)
allows use of declarations against penal interest; in criminal cases,
however, where such declarations are offered to exculpate the accused,
they are admissible only if their trustworthiness is indicated by corro-
borating circumstances. Florida's declarant-unavailable exception in-
cludes declarations against proprietary or pecuniary, but not penal, in-
terests." 7
109. In civil cases, use of former testimony is governed by FLA. STAT. § 92.22 (1973).
That section states the unavailability requirement much more broadly than the Federal
Rules; § 92.22(4) requires "[t]hat a substantial reason [be] shown why the original
witness or document is not produced."
Use of the former testimony exception in criminal cases was approved in Richardson
v. State, 247 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1971), citing Blackwell v. State, 86 So. 244 (Fla. 1920).
110. See James v. State, 254 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1971), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 985 (1972).
111. See Putnal v. State, 47 So. 864 (Fla. 1908).
112. See Habig v. Bastian, 158 So. 508 (Fla. 1935).
113. See Anderson v. Gaither, 162 So. 877 (Fla. 1935). See also FLA. STAT. § 92.22(4)
(1973). Fla. H.R. 471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.804) would adopt the federal criteria and apply
them uniformly to all declarant-unavailable hearsay exceptions.
- 114. See Johnson v. State, 58 So. 540 (Fla. 1912); Coatney v. State, 55 So. 285 (Fla.
1911).
115. This question is not often litigated in Florida. S. GAm, FLORIDA Evmr.NcF Rule
161, at 238 (1967). One case that purports to rule on the subject makes no mention of a
showing of unavailability, and the holding of admissibility might well have been made
under a party-agent admission rationale. See Wise v. Western Union Tel. Co., 177 So. 2d
765 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1965). Francis v. State, 308 So. 2d 174, 176 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1975), implies that although death of the declarant is the sole "traditional" criterion
of unavailability, the court is willing to recognize illness, insanity, absence from the
jurisdiction, incompetency through interest, and exercise of the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination. Fla. H.R. 471 § 1 (1975) (§ 9 0.80 4 (2)(c)) would solidify and
define this exception.
116. See Johnson v. State, 58 So. 540 (Fla. 1912); Coatney v. State, 55 So. 285 (Fla.
1911). This was also the common law rule. C. MCCORMIcK, EvIDENCE § 283 (2d ed.
1972). Fla. H.R. 471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.804(2)(b)) would admit dying declarations in
both civil and criminal cases.
117. Francis v. State, 308 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975). In criminal cases
this approach may infringe constitutional rights. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284 (1973), where the exclusion of a declaration against penal interest was held
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Finally, the Rules leave federal courts a means by which they may
do substantial justice in the event hearsay testimony is offered which
does not fall within an enumerated exception. Under Rules 803(24)
and 804(b)(5), a court may admit such evidence if it is offered to prove
a material fact, it is more probative than any reasonably available al-
ternative evidence, its admission will serve the interests of justice, and
the opponent has an opportunity to prepare to meet it. Florida trial
courts have no such discretion. The state supreme court, however,
may occasionally ratify a trial decision admitting evidence without an
established hearsay exception. 118
VI. MISCELLANEOUS DIFFERENCES
There are several other areas of evidence law where discrepancies
between federal and Florida rules are significant. This section is not
exhaustive of these areas, but enough discussion will be presented to
highlight differences in basic approach.
A. Offers to Compromise
Federal Rule 408 excludes evidence of offers and attempts to
compromise a claim, and of conduct and statements included therein, to
prove liability, invalidity, or amount of a claim. Florida has dis-
tinguished evidence of conditional or hypothetical offers, which is
inadmissible, from unconditional admissions of facts supporting a
claim, which may be admitted although part of a settlement offer.",,
It is uncertain whether state courts would adhere to this rule if the
question were presented today.1so
B. Liability Insurance
Evidence of insurance vel non is inadmissible to prove liability
under Federal Rule 411, although it may be admitted to prove agency,
ownership, control, or witness bias. Current Florida law allows in-
to violate the confrontation clause. In that case a criminal defendant had not been
allowed to impeach his own witness (who denied having confessed to the crime) or to
introduce hearsay evidence (in proof of that alleged confession), even though circum-
stances tended to corroborate it.
118. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Getrost, 10 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1942). The proposed Florida
code has no open-ended provisions comparable to those of the Federal Rules.
119. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Bunting, 183 So. 321 (Fla. 1938).
120. Cf. Jordan v. City of Coral Gables, 191 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1966) (holding evidence
of settlement between defendant and third party inadmissible). The proposed Florida
code excludes "any relevant conduct or statements" in the negotiation process. Fla. H.R.
471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.408).
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surance companies to be joined as real parties in interest,1 ' and a
severance may not be granted absent a justiciable issue related to in-
surance. 2 Therefore the presence of the insurance interest cannot
be hidden in many instances, although presumably evidence of in-
surance cannot be used to demonstrate or suggest liability.
2
C. Refreshing Recollection
If a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory prior to testifying,
Federal Rule 612 allows opposing counsel, if the court so permits in
the interests of justice, to inspect the writing and cross-examine the
witness on it. Florida cases allow trial courts the same discretion
negatively phrased; that is, no error is committed by not allowing in-
spection by the adverse party.1
24
D. The Rule of Sequestration
Federal Rule 615 allows the court to exclude witnesses during
presentation of others' testimony. An exception is recognized for
parties, agents of corporate parties, and persons essential to the pre-
sentation of a party's case. This last category applies to criminal cases;
it allows the federal prosecutor to have an investigative agent present
for consultation throughout the trial, to counter the advantage the
defense supposedly enjoys in consulting the accused. 12 5 The Rule's
wording suggests that the exclusion of such agents from the effect
of "the rule" is mandatory: where the prosecutor demonstrates need,
sequestration is not authorized. In Florida, permitting a witness to
remain in court is discretionary.
26
121. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
122. Stecher v. Pomeroy, 253 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1971).
123. Mention of insurance in a context that may suggest liability might be pre-
judicial, depending on the statement itself and the circumstances. See Allred v. Chitten-
den Pool Supply, Inc., 298 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1974); Pierce v. Smith, 301 So. 2d 805 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974). Likewise, some federal cases hold that in some contexts mention
of "insurance" at trial may be grounds for mistrial. See Corbett v. Borandi, 375 F.2d
265 (3d Cir. 1967); Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Trehern, 155 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1946).
Presumably Florida courts would be more tolerant in direct action cases, since the
company counsel has an opportunity to rebut or object to unfair remarks.
124. Kimbrough v. State, 219 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Williams v.
State, 208 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
125. SENATE REPORT 26.
126. West v. State, 6 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1942). In that case the witness was allowed to
remain even though his presence was not shown to be essential to the prosecution.
Therefore, the Federal Rule may in some cases disadvantage defendants less than the
Florida approach. The proposed Florida code is silent on the point.
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E. Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony
Federal Rule 703 allows an expert to state his opinion even when
the underlying facts or data are not admissible in evidence. Florida
-law allows the expert to testify only on the basis of his personal
examination and observations, on the basis of others' testimony if
the expert has been present in court and heard it all, or in response to
a hypothetical question.12 Facts submitted in a hypothetical question
must be supported by evidence already in the record or by reasonable
inference therefrom.""8 Thus experts may not rely on facts propounded
by counsel prior to testimony, or on the out-of-court statements and
opinions of others, even if reasonably relied upon by experts in that
area generally. This restriction may encourage the use of awkward,
time-consuming hypotheticals, and is at variance with the actual
diagnostic practice of experts." 9
F. Best Evidence
Federal Rule 1003 relaxes the best evidence rule. It allows ad-
mission of duplicates, including carbon copies, photocopies, and
chemically produced copies, to the same extent as an original unless
a genuine question is raised as to authenticity, or unless it would
be unfair to admit a duplicate (as with a negotiable instrument).
Florida law allows admission of duplicates only where the original is
unavailable, 1 ° or where a statute specifically authorizes admission of
duplicates.1s1 Further, the state appears to impose a hierarchy of
secondary evidence; the availability of any level of secondary evidence
renders inadmissible the levels below it. The hierarchy extends from
127. Jones v. State, 289 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1974).
128. Arkin Constr. Co. v. Simpkins, 99 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1957); Nat Harrison Assoc.
v. Byrd, 256 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
129. See Ehrhardt, supra note 8, at 707-10. The proposed Florida code settles this
issue by not requiring the basis for expert testimony to be admissible if of a kind
reasonably relied upon by experts in the subject to support the opinion expressed. Fla.
H.R. 471 § 1 (1975) (§ 90.704). Section 90.705 includes an additional safeguard for
the party against whom the expert opinion is offered: the opportunity to voir dire the
witness as to the facts underlying his opinion prior to testimony as to the opinion
itself. Federal Rule 705 allows disclosure only on cross-examination, or where the
court so requires.
130. Wicker v. Board of Public Instruction, 31 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1947). Fla. H.R. 471
§ 1 (1975) (§ 90.1003) would adopt substantially the Federal Rule.
131. See Florida Cent. & Pac. R.R. v. Seymour, 33 So. 424 (Fla. 1902); cf. FLA. STAT. §§
15.16 (Department of State records); 18.20(4) (State Treasury records); 28.30(4) (circuit
court records); 229.781(1) (Department of Education records); 321.23(3) (1973) (De-
partment of Highway Safety records); FLA. STAT. § 92.12 (Supp. 1974) (certified copies
of instruments and records). Generally, the contents of any public record inconvenient
to remove may be proved by a duly authenticated copy.
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carbon copies to photocopies, 132 to copies of copies.1 33 The Federal
Rule makes no such distinctions.
G. Weight and Sufficiency
A difficult final question is whether, in a federal action decided
under state substantive law, issues of weight and sufficiency of
evidence are resolved by reference to federal or state law. The Federal
Rules are silent on this point. A plurality of circuits, including the
Fifth, looks to federal law on weight and sufficiency. 3 4 Despite the
conflict among circuits, the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the
issue. 1 85 Where each forum looks to its own law for guidance on so
vital a question, the incentive to forum shop is increased.
VII. CONCLUSION
This discussion of the conflicts between federal and Florida evidence
law suggests certain underlying jurisprudential differences. The fol-
lowing observations are speculative insofar as they rest only on the
differences between the two forums and not on the many similarities.
First, Florida law is more prohibitive than the Federal Rules in
admitting evidence generally. Restrictions in the areas of competency
(especially the Deadman's Statute), impeachment, and hearsay are
examples. But the Florida rules are not always more restrictive;
Florida is more lenient in permitting impeachment by prior convic-
tion, for example. Perhaps the Federal Rules contemplate a more
sophisticated jury, or at least one capable of appreciating for itself
that some forms of testimony are suspect. By exposing the factfinder
to a greater volume of relevant information, the Federal Rules pro-
mote "truth-finding" as a trial goal at the expense of such other values
as simplicity and communicational privilege. 3 6
132. Wicker v. Board of Public Instruction, 31 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1947). Fla. H.R.
471 § 1 (1975) (§§ 90.1001(4), .1004) makes none of these distinctions.
133. Morris Kirschman & Co. v. Garrett, 308 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1975); Continental Aviation Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 173 So. 2d 750 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
134. See ABC-Paramount Records, Inc. v. Topps Record Distrib. Co., 374 F.2d 455
(5th Cir. 1967); Annot., 10 A.L.R. FED. 451 (1972). The Fourth, Seventh, Ninth and
Tenth Circuits have also held that federal law controls as to weight and sufficiency in
diversity cases. The Sixth and Eighth Circuits have held state law controls. The Second
and Third Circuits have had mixed results. Annot., supra.
135. In Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959), the issue was passed
over because both parties assumed state law governed.
136. As a sort of obbligato, the Rules impose a greater burden of investigation and
persuasion on the opponent of the evidence. Rothstein, Some Themes in the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 FED. B.J. 21 (1974). This approach, Rothstein suggests,
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Secondly, Florida law seems to discourage judicial initiative. While
federal law does not require participation by the bench, the Rules
allow it and there is no inhibitive standard for review other than
"abuse of discretion." It may not be possible to reconstruct from a
transcript the subtle effects of judicial initiative. Therefore, individual
litigants may feel less certain and secure in presenting their cases, and
appellate courts may feel the system less uniform. Again, the Federal
Rules apparently presume the jury is capable of withstanding minor
judicial infelicities that do not amount to abuse of discretion. The
federal judge at a pretrial conference under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is allowed a similarly activist role in simplifying and
ordering the trial process.
Finally, neither forum places a premium on the simplicity of its
evidence law. In Florida this difficulty stems partly from an ad hoc
approach to rulemaking that renders the law difficult to locate. That
approach also leaves gaps in which it is uncertain what principles will
apply. The Federal Rules are simpler in that general principles are
easier to recognize, and ancient aberrations like the Deadman's Statute
are left out. Yet the Federal Rules are not simplistic; they are a
scholarly product that has, in places, been mischievously com-
promised.13 7 At least one commentator considers the lack of simplicity
a major defect. 38
The advantages of codified rules, and of the Federal Rules in
particular, should be obvious by this time. While evidence codifica-
tions cannot reduce the number of trials, they can, by virtue of easy
access and comprehensiveness, streamline the trial process and there-
by alleviate crowded dockets somewhat. Evidence codification should
also reduce the number of appeals on evidentiary points. Further-
more, if lawyers spend less time niggling over existing common law
rules outside the jury's hearing, then the jury's (and perhaps the
parties' and witnesses') confidence in the trial process will increase.
When codification is combined with an approach to factfinding that
allows more relevant information to reach the jury, the overall benefit
is substantial.
Evaluated from the perspective of the Federal Rules, many aspects
of Florida evidence law seem illogical and antiquated. Moreover, the
hurts the accused in criminal proceedings, where exclusion usually favors the defense.
Consider the effect of Federal Rules 201 (judicial notice), 405 (methods of proving
character), 601 (general rule of competency), 706 (court appointed experts), and the
liberal rules of Articles VIII (hearsay) and IX (authentication of documents). "Street
wisdom" suggests that these provisions will be of little comfort to the defense,
137. See, e.g., notes 11.20 and accompanying text supra,
138. See Weinberg, supra note 6, at 607.
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number of significant variances between state and federal evidence
law creates considerable practical problems for Florida attorneys.
Florida evidence law needs revision and codification. A few unsettled
questions notwithstanding, the Federal Rules should prove a major
success. Florida would do well to follow the federal example.
DAVID K. MILLER
